We use cross-country data on a sample of 210 large Western European banks during the 10-year period from 2000 to 2009 to evaluate the impact of government ownership on bank risk. Two main results emerge from our analysis. First, government-owned banks (GOBs) have a lower default risk but higher operating risk than private banks, indicating that they benefit from a government protection mechanism in the form of implicit guarantees. Second, the evolution of GOBs' operating risk and governmental protection over the electoral cycle is significantly different from that of private banks. These results are consistent with the political view of bank government ownership and have important policy implications for recently nationalized European banks.
Introduction
Within the European banking industry, privately owned banks (POBs) and government-owned banks (GOBs) have always coexisted. Although their roots are different, large GOBs and POBs have typically evolved to a similar full-service banking model, thereby competing in the same markets, under the same regulatory framework. Indeed, most of these banks are virtually indistinguishable in terms of their range of activities, being active at both the domestic and international levels. This nationalization of part of the European banking industry has, in turn, revived the debate concerning the advisability and consequences of government bank ownership.
As argued by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) , government protection subsidizes GOBs and induces a more aggressive risk-taking behavior. This in turn can distort competition and prevent the proper functioning of market discipline.
Following this line of reasoning, in the first part of this study we empirically investigate whether Western European GOBs and POBs differ in their risk profiles. Since GOBs presumably enjoy stronger government protection, we distinguish between default and operating risk. Default risk reflects the probability that a bank's creditors suffer losses as a consequence of a delay in interest or principal payment, debt restructuring, or bankruptcy. Operating risk simply reflects the probability that a bank's asset value decrease below the value of its liabilities, thereby leading to negative equity capital. We measure default risk with traditional issuer credit ratings, while operating risk is proxied by individual ratings, which focus on banks' intrinsic economic and financial conditions and do not take into account any external support.
Our empirical results, based on data from [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] , indicate that GOBs have a lower default risk than POBs. However, this difference is not the consequence of better economic and financial conditions, since GOBs have higher operating risk than POBs. Similar results are found when using direct measures of external support, based on the difference between issuer and individual ratings. The lower default risk of GOBs, associated with their higher operating risk, suggests the presence of governmental protection that induces higher risk taking.
GOBs' more aggressive risk-taking behavior due to governmental protection is costly in terms of potential distortions to competition, cost of rescuing troubled banks, and so forth. However, such greater risk is not necessarily suboptimal from a social perspective if GOB risk-taking activities pursue social goals and address market failures. For example, GOBs may finance socially profitable projects that are unprofitable for private banks to finance. On the other hand, GOBs are essentially controlled by politicians, who may pursue their own goals rather than social ones. Put another way, taxpayers bear the cost of the governmental protection that induces GOBs to take on more risk and insulates them from market forces. The relevant question then becomes: What are taxpayers paying for?
Social goals or political goals?
We address this issue in the second part of the paper. More specifically, we investigate whether GOBs' risk-taking behavior has a significantly different sensitivity to the electoral cycle than that of POBs. We find that GOBs' operating risk and external support are significantly sensitive to the electoral cycle. These results are consistent with the political role (as opposed to the social role) of the government as a bank shareholder.
The main contribution of our research is therefore twofold. First, we show that government ownership impacts bank risk in complex ways: While operating risk is increased due to moral hazard, default risk is decreased due to conjectural guarantees associated with government ownership. Second, we provide evidence that GOB risk responds to the electoral cycle, consistent with the political view of government ownership. This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents the research questions and the paper's main contributions. Section 4 describes our empirical strategy and Section 5 discusses the data sources and summarizes the empirical sample characteristics. Section 6 presents the empirical results and their economic interpretation. Section 7 concludes by focusing on the policy implications of our empirical results.
Related literature
Two alternative theories have been put forward to explain the role of governments as bank owners: i) the social view and ii) the political view.
According to the social view, government ownership of banks facilitates the financing of projects that private banks are unable or unwilling to finance, particularly projects that can help economic development (Stiglitz, 1993) .
According to this theory, GOBs address market failures and improve social welfare. A larger share of GOBs in the national banking industry should then be associated with higher economic growth.
In contrast, the political view emphasizes political rather than social objectives.
According to this alternative theory, GOBs are used by politicians to provide low cost of financing to supporters, who return the favor in the form of votes and political contributions. As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point out, while government-owned firms are technically "controlled by the public," they are run by bureaucrats who can be thought of as having "extremely concentrated control rights, but no significant cash flow rights." Additionally, political bureaucrats have goals that are often in conflict with social welfare improvements and dictated by political interests.
In the last 20 years, an extensive literature has examined the consequences of government ownership of banks. These studies can broadly be classified into two main types:
Macroeconomic comparative studies, mostly aimed at investigating the consequences of banks' government ownership on economic growth, financial development, and other macroeconomic features at the country level, and
(ii) Microeconomic studies, mostly aimed at comparing the efficiency, profitability, and, more generally, the performance of GOBs versus POBs at the individual bank level. Some studies look at the rationale behind GOB behavior.
The first type of studies (macro) includes Barth et al. (2001) and La Porta et al. (2002) , who find that countries with a larger share of GOBs in the banking industry have a lower level of financial development and register lower economic growth. Beck and Levine (2002) also fail to find any positive effect of GOBs on economic growth. Caprio and Peria (2000) show that greater government ownership of banks tends to increase the likelihood of banking crises. These studies therefore find no evidence supporting the social view. Adrianova et al.
(2009), however, find that -all else being equal -countries with a high degree of banks' government ownership have grown faster than countries with little banks' government ownership.
The second type of studies (micro) is aimed at extending to the banking industry the traditional question concerning the impact of government ownership on firm efficiency and profitability. Indeed, an extensive empirical literature documents the inefficiency of government-owned non-banking firms, the political motives behind the public provision of services, and the benefits of privatization (e.g., Megginson et al., 1994; Barberis et al., 1996; Lopez-de-Silanes et al., 1997; Frydman et al., 1999; La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999) . Micro studies can be further classified into two categories: i) studies that compare the performance (efficiency/profitability) of GOBs versus POBs and ii) studies that investigate the motivation behind GOB behavior.
Several papers document that GOBs are less efficient than POBs (La Porta et al., 2002; Barth et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2005; Micco et al., 2007 , Iannotta et al., 2007 . However, Altunbas et al. (2001) , focusing on the German banking industry, find little evidence that POBs are more efficient than GOBs, although the latter have slight cost and profit advantages over POBs.
Among micro studies, only three explicitly investigate the rationale behind GOB behavior. Sapienza (2004) examines the lending behavior of Italian GOBs and finds that they mostly favor borrowers located in depressed areas, consistent with the social view. However, the author also finds that the lending behavior of Italian GOBs is affected by the electoral results of the party affiliated with the bank: Consistent with the political view, the stronger the political party in the borrower's area, the lower the interest rates charged. Dinç (2005) shows that in emerging markets GOBs increase their lending in election years relative to private banks. No such effect is found in developed economies. Finally, Micco et al. (2007) find that the efficiency of emerging market GOBs varies with the electoral cycle.
The two categories of micro studies -involving the performance of GOBs versus that of POBs and the rationale of GOB behavior -are clearly connected.
Indeed, lower GOB profitability and efficiency may be related to the fact that GOBs finance projects with high social returns that POBs are not willing to fund due to their low private returns (social view). Alternatively, GOBs may be less profitable and efficient than POBs because they are run by political bureaucrats and have goals in contrast with value creation (political view). To sum up, GOBs may pursue political and social goals at the cost of lower efficiency and profitability. The same type of link should characterize not only GOB efficiency and profitability but also their risk profile. Indeed, irrespective of the theoretical motivation for banks' government ownership (social or political), it is clear that a bank's "mission" affects its behavior and consequently its risk profile.
Research questions and contribution
This paper tests whether GOBs and POBs have different risk profiles and tries to shed light on the cause of this difference. In this respect, our paper combines the two abovementioned types of micro studies. On one hand, we focus our analysis on the risk profile of GOBs versus POBs. On the other hand, to understand the rationale behind GOB risk-taking behavior, we examine the difference between GOBs' and POBs' risk profiles over the electoral cycle.
To compare the risk profiles of GOBs and POBs, we need to distinguish between default risk (likelihood of creditors' loss) and operating risk (likelihood of insolvency, i.e., negative equity). As mentioned in the introduction, the difference between default risk and operating risk arises because of an external support, such as government intervention to rescue insolvent banks, which would prevent a technically insolvent firm from default.
The government bailout of troubled banks is generally aimed at avoiding negative externalities related to bank failure (contagious runs, disruption of credit flows, etc.). Nonetheless, the ex ante expectation of government intervention can generate moral hazard, increasing banks' incentives to take more risk. The presence of implicit governmental protection therefore produces two different effects. On one hand, default risk decreases, since government intervention protects creditors from any loss. On the other hand, expected government intervention induces banks to take excessive risks, resulting in a higher operating risk.
While all (large) banks may benefit from some sort of government guarantee, there are reasons to believe that GOBs enjoy stronger protection. Faccio et al. (2006) provide evidence consistent with this idea. They find that politically connected firms are significantly more likely to be bailed out than similar nonconnected firms. Arguably, the likelihood of government intervention is higher if the ultimate entity responsible for a bank's insolvency is the government itself, as the bank owner. One can therefore expect that -all else being equal -GOBs have lower default risk because of stronger government protection. Indeed, Brown and Dinç (2011) present evidence that defaults are less common for GOBs than for
POBs. This study makes three main contributions to the literature. First, it focuses on GOBs' risk profile rather than on their performance (efficiency, profitability, etc.).
This is important not only to understand the probability of government entities facing losses associated with distress, but also to assess the effect of government ownership on banks' risk-taking behavior. Indeed, while higher risk levels are not necessarily suboptimal from a social point of view, since riskier banks may be so because of stronger lending activity to younger and more innovative firms, a more aggressive risk-taking behavior due to government ownership represents a potential social cost in terms of distorted competition, malfunctioning market mechanisms, bailout costs, and so on. As such, while we cannot a priori negatively evaluate a higher bank risk level, in our analysis, as in other banking studies, we adopt the view of regulators/deposit insurers, who aim to discourage banks from excessive risk taking. Moreover, if GOBs have higher operating risk, it is important to understand whether such behavior is due to political influence.
When looking at bank risk, our methodology is based on the joint use of issuer ratings, a synthetic measure of a bank's probability of default, and individual ratings, which omit the influence of any external support and focus on a bank's operating risk, that is, its probability of becoming technically insolvent. More specifically, we exploit the difference between a bank's issuer and its individual rating. This allows us to directly test for the presence of government debt guarantees and separately address a bank's operating and default risk.
Second, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study documenting the risk profile of GOBs during a period that also includes the recent financial crisis.
Anecdotal evidence from the German banking system clearly shows that stateowned wholesale banks -or Landesbanken -were at least as affected as private banks by the negative consequences of high-risk activities such as investments in toxic assets (The Economist, 2009a , 2009b .
Finally, different from most available studies on GOBs -which generally take a wide, international comparative approach or limit their analysis to emerging markets or to individual countries -we focus our attention on the Western European banking industry. Such a focus clearly has some limitations, since our empirical results may be specific to the countries included in our sample.
Nonetheless, the use of government ownership of banks for political goals has been documented for emerging markets (e.g., Dinç, 2005) , whose institutional characteristics tend to facilitate the political influence of GOBs. Any evidence of the political use of GOBs in developed economies would represent stronger empirical support of the political view of government ownership and, at the same time, strengthen the case for complete privatization of the banking industry.
Moreover, a focus on Western European banks allows us to avoid the problems of dealing with banks belonging to countries characterized by significant differences in banking regulation. Indeed, our sample banks share a system of minimum common banking supervisory rules dictated by European Union directives.
In addition to this, focusing on the European banking industry is important for two main reasons. First, unlike the US, Europe has always seen GOBs coexisting with POBs. More recently, the government bailouts of many large European banking groups has led to an increase in the number and relevance of GOBs. 
Research methodology

Measuring bank risk
The main goal of this study is to test for any systematic difference between the risk profiles of GOBs and POBs. There are different ways to measure the risk of a bank. The first and most common is based on the use of accounting ratios measuring the bank's liquidity, leverage, asset quality, profitability, and so forth.
These ratios are easy to compute and have the advantage of being generally available for all banks. However, besides being all based on accounting values, they have a major drawback in that they do not allow to construct a unique measure of default risk to be used as the dependent variable of a multivariate regression. A typical problem in analyzing risk using accounting ratios is endogeneity. For instance, regressing leverage over return on equity may be problematic since leverage can affect return on equity in the first place (Berger, 1995) . One attempt to address this problem is represented by the insolvency risk Z score (De Nicolò, 2001 ), based on a bank's leverage and the mean and volatility of its return on assets. However, this measure appears methodologically weak since it implicitly assumes that the quality of a bank's assets is properly reflected in the volatility of its accounting profit; more importantly, it relies on the standard deviation of the bank's return on assets, which in turn is either measured on a very limited number of observations or relies on distant past observations.
A second approach is based on the use of market variables, such as the spread of a bank's credit default swaps or of its outstanding bonds, the volatility of its stock return, or its stock's beta. These variables are generally more effective in representing a bank's risk because they reflect the capital markets' perception of risk. In addition, market-based measures allow to overcome the above mentioned problem of accounting ratios, since they incorporate a wide number of factorsnot only the bank's economic and financial conditions (capitalization, liquidity, profitability, asset quality, etc.) but also its management quality, organization, governance, and so on. However, for the purpose of this study, market-based variables are problematic since they reflect not only a bank's operating risk but also the implicit support from the governmental entities participating in its equity capital. In other words, market-based variables properly measure only default risk.
In addition, market-based measures are often unavailable for GOBs. As an example, out of our 128 sample banks in 2008, only 50 (less than 40%) were listed in a stock exchange.
A third approach is based on credit ratings. Two main types of bank ratings exist. The most common and well known -issuer ratings -represent a synthetic measure of a bank's probability of default and reflect not only a bank's profitability, asset quality, risk, management quality, and macroeconomic conditions, but also the potential support from an external entity such as a parent company, regulatory agency, and/or local or national government. However, individual ratings -such as Fitch Ratings' Individual ratings (FRI) and Moody's Bank Financial Strength ratings (MBFS) -are similar to traditional issuer ratings but differ in that they examine a bank's insolvency risk as reflected in its financial conditions and omit the influence of any external support. As such, these ratings represent an ideal measure of a bank's probability of becoming technically insolvent, not taking into account whether this potential insolvency would trigger government intervention or not.
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These different types of banks' credit ratings offer two important advantages.
First, they allow to overcome the abovementioned problems of accounting ratios since they represent a clear-cut exogenous variable. Second, using both types of ratings allows to explicitly distinguish between a bank's default risk, which also incorporates the possibility of government intervention, and its operating risk, which is independent from this external factor. Credit ratings therefore also allow to overcome the abovementioned problem posed by market-based risk variables.
Despite the importance of credit ratings in financial regulation, their accuracy is sometimes questioned. Nonetheless, empirical evidence consistently indicates that credit ratings are an important determinant of bond yield spreads for both 3 Individual ratings are not new in banking research. Using a sample of subordinated bonds issued over 1991 -2000 :Q1, Sironi (2003 finds that spreads at issuance reflect quite accurately banks' individual ratings. More recently, Gropp et al. (2011) estimate the likelihood of external support as the difference between issuer rating (which accounts for external bail outs) and individual ratings (which ignores the possibility of any external intervention).
banks and non-banking issuers (Elton et al., 2001; Gabbi and Sironi, 2005) . Most importantly, ratings are considered very accurate as relative risk measures.
Indeed, agencies make it clear that their ratings do not reflect the absolute probability of default since they are just an ordinal ranking of risk. The ex post statistics of default by rating class invariantly confirm their extreme accuracy as relative measures. This paper does not aim to estimate banks' probability of default; rather, it compares the risk of GOBs relative to that of POBs. For the purpose of this paper, credit ratings therefore appear to be reliable risk proxies.
Direct measures of external support
As mentioned earlier, while government ownership should reduce GOBs' default risk (i.e., better issuer ratings), its effect on operating risk (i.e., individual ratings) is subtle. Governmental protection may generate moral hazard, inducing
GOBs to take on more operating risk. On the other hand, since the government itself would bear the cost of bailing out insolvent GOBs, they may actually limit their operating risk. Therefore, as an alternative way to investigate the effect of government ownership on bank risk taking, one could look at the difference between default risk and operating risk. Such a difference would reflect the extent of governmental support.
We employ two different measures of support. The first is based on the mere difference between individual and issuer ratings, both converted into a numerical scale. Fitch's individual and issuer ratings are not directly comparable since the two scales are different. In contrast, Moody's provides a conversion thus lower cost of funding than smaller ones. In addition, the existence of nonfinancial scale economies should allow larger banks to benefit from cost efficiency gains, even if the inherent complexity of larger banks mitigates this effect. As a result, all else being equal, we expect larger banks to exhibit relatively better ratings (i.e., negative coefficient sign). A larger size may lead to a better rating also because of some too-big-to-fail mechanism. If this is the case, then we expect SIZE to be significantly related to issuer ratings but not to individual ones.
If, instead, SIZE has other benefits in terms of a lower credit risk (e.g., because of profit diversification, scale economies, etc.), it should also remain significant when individual ratings are analyzed.
The variable GDPCHG is the annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of the country where bank i is located. The variable LIST is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank is listed in a stock exchange, and zero otherwise.
Controlling for this factor is important since this can affect a bank's risk-taking behavior, independent of the nature of its ownership (GOB versus POB). To 6 Either directly or through other entities. 7 Results obtained by using GOB20 (equal to one if the government holds at least 20% of the bank's equity, and zero otherwise) are qualitatively similar. 8 To obtain comparable values, we convert the total assets of banks in the sample into euros.
account for country-specific effects, we always include year and country dummies.
In some specifications we employ a set of accounting variables, including the following ratios: i) operating profit to total earning assets (PROFIT), ii) book value of equity to total assets (CAPITAL), and iii) loan loss provisions to total loans (LOANLOSS).
Sensitivity to the electoral cycle
The second part of our analysis investigates whether the evolution of GOB and POB operating risk and external support across the electoral cycle show a statistically significant difference. This allows us to understand whether GOB Porta et al. (2002) and Dinç (2005) , who select the 10 largest banks in each country. The focus on the largest European banks is partly due to data limitations, since credit ratings are only available for large banks, and partly related to the subject of our investigation, since government ownership is typically associated with larger banks. By limiting our analysis to only the largest banks, we also manage to achieve a more balanced sample in terms of bank size, with a lower standard deviation for sample banks size and no significant difference between the average sizes of GOBs and POBs. 12 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. 13 On the other side, we inevitably end up with a less balanced sample in terms of country composition. This equity stake is, on average, higher in Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, and
Portugal and lower in Greece, Italy, and France.
Empirical results
Descriptive and univariate analysis
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 report sample descriptive statistics for ISSUER,
INDIVIDUAL, the support variables SUPPMOODYS and SUPPFITCH, SIZE
(expressed as the amount of total assets), and the control variables CAPITAL, PROFIT, and LOANLOSS. Statistics are provided for the entire sample and are also broken up into year subsamples to detect any trend. In Table 4 we perform ttests for the equality of GOB versus POB variable means. We find that GOBs exhibit better issuer ratings and worse individual ratings than POBs. The tests on support variables confirm that GOBs benefit from stronger external support, as expected.
While the difference in SIZE is not statistically significant, GOBs and POBs differ in terms of other accountings variables: GOBs are less capitalized, less profitable and have a higher ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans, indicating poorer asset quality. These results are consistent with Dinç (2005) and are confirmed with both definitions of GOB (GOB and GOB10).
As already mentioned, the average size of GOBs and POBs in our sample are not statistically different. Consequently, the results of our analysis should not be affected by any too-big-to-fail mechanism. indicating that -all else being equal -listed banks are considered by rating agencies to have a higher default risk.
Are GOBs riskier?
Columns 5 to 8 of An alternative way to check this result is to substitute the accounting variables with the banks' individual ratings. This is done in columns 9 to 12 of 
Robustness tests on ratings results
So far our results indicate that GOBs have a higher operating risk and benefit from greater governmental support than POBs. These findings are robust to a number of checks. although the statistical significance is somewhat lower when using individual ratings as the dependent variable. Our findings are also confirmed when clustering standard errors at both the country and bank levels (row 4) and when employing ratings from each rating agency individually (rows 5 to 7). Since German banks account for a large portion of our sample, we also run regressions focusing on observations related to non-German banks only (row 8). When the issuer rating is the dependent variable, the statistical significance of GOB coefficient is lower. In other words, it is not entirely clear whether non-German GOBs have better issuer ratings than non-German POBs. However, the results on individual ratings confirm that non-German GOBs take on more operating risk.
Do GOBs' operating risk and external support change over the political cycle?
Operating risk and external support
We now move to our third research question: Are GOB operating risk and governmental protection related to political motivations? This more specifically allows us to investigate the two theories underlying the government ownership of banks, the social view and the political view. Government ownership of banks can be socially desirable if GOBs mitigate market failures. However, the presence of a government entity among a bank's shareholders implies that politicians can influence the bank's behavior. To test whether such influence is aimed at pursuing political goals (as opposed to social ones), we examine the effect of electoral cycles on GOB operating risk and external support.
More specifically, we adapt the approach used by Dinç (2005) to our research question and run OLS regressions of INDIVIDUAL and SUPPMOODYS on an election dummy, the interaction between elections and GOB, and bank fixed effects. 14 We include up to two lagged terms of the election dummy and its interaction with GOB to capture the delayed effects of elections on GOB risktaking behavior as measured by ratings. 
Lending behavior and profitability
So far our results indicate that GOBs have a higher operating risk and benefit from greater external support than POBs and that these differences are more pronounced during election years. One economic interpretation of these empirical results is that GOBs increase their operating risk during election years by inefficiently expanding their loan portfolios to favor political supporters. This interpretation is consistent with Dinç (2005) , who finds that emerging markets GOBs tend to expand their loan portfolios during election years. Such lending behavior is compatible with our results for the electoral cycle, since the inefficient expansion of loans arguably leads to higher operating risk.
To empirically investigate this economic interpretation, we again follow Dinç's (2005) methodology to test for the hypothesis that the lending behavior of GOBs and POBs differs over electoral cycles. In addition, we test whether GOB profitability is affected by the electoral cycle. More specifically, we estimate the following OLS regression, with the inclusion of banks' fixed effects:
LOANSCHG i,t = f(ELECTION i,t , Gob i,t ×ELECTION i,t , GDPCGH i,t , Accounting i, t-1 )+ε i,t
where LOANSCHG -the dependent variable -is the change in bank i's total loans in year t, normalized by total assets from the previous year, that is (Total Loans tTotal Loans t-1 )/Total Assets t-1 . We use the annual GDP growth rate (GDPCHG) to control for demand-side effects on loans. Accounting is a set of bank-specific variables reflecting factors that affect a bank's loans growth, namely, i) SIZE t-1 , the log of total assets as of year t-1; ii) LOANS t-1 , the ratio of loans to total earning assets as of year t-1, iii) DEPOSITS t-1 , the ratio of retail deposits to total funding as of year t-1, and iv) CAPITAL t-1 , total equity divided by total assets as of year t-1. We use the lagged values for all four variables to avoid endogeneity problems.
Besides investigating the effect of the electoral cycle on GOB loans, we also look at the effect of elections on GOB profitability by replacing LOANSCHG with PROFITCHG (the annual change in profit) in Equation (5):
f(ELECTION i,t , Gob i,t ×ELECTION i,t , GDPCGH i,t , Accounting i,t-1 , Controls)+ε i,t
A statistically significant coefficient for the interactive term GOB×ELECTION in Equations (5) (positive) and (6) (negative) would indicate that -consistent with the political view -GOBs are subject to political influence and expand their loan portfolios. The results, reported in Table 7 , are consistent with our expectations.
Indeed, the interacted variable based on the two dummies ELECTION and GOB is positive and significant, indicating that GOBs tend to expand their loan portfolios more than private banks during elections. This is true using both GOB and
GOB10.
The results involving the PROFITCHG regressions are also consistent with our expectations, since the interactive terms are negative and significant, indicating that GOB profitability tends to decrease during election years.
In conclusion, these results indicate that -consistent with the political viewWestern European GOBs appear to be subject to political pressures.
Conclusions
This study investigates whether any significant difference exists in the default and operating risk of government-owned banks with respect to private banks. We find that, on average, government-owned banks have a lower default risk -as reflected in better issuer ratings -than their private counterparts. However, this lower default risk does not derive from a lower operating risk -as would be reflected in better economic and financial conditions -but, rather, from governmental support. Thanks to this government protection mechanism, GOBs are likely to benefit from a lower cost of funding when issuing debt securities in capital markets. In addition, government protection shields GOBs from the effects of market discipline and provides them with an incentive to increase risk taking. 
Reported is the numerical equivalent of both Moody's financial strength (individual) and issuer ratings according to Moody's rating mapping, as provided by Moody's Investors Service (2005). Reported is the bailout probability assigned by Gropp et al. (2011) to each class of Fitch's support ratings. Reported are the number of banks and bank-years, classified by year and country; the number of GOBs and GOB-years, classified by year and country; and the sample equity-weighted average government stake, classified by year and country (weights are computed as the ratio of each bank's book value of equity to the sum of the book value of equity of all banks in the year/country). GOBs are defined in two alternative ways: GOB is a dummy variable that equals one if any percentage of the bank's equity capital is held by either a national or local government, and zero otherwise, and GOB10 is a dummy variable that equals one if either a national or local government holds at least 10% of the bank's equity capital, and zero otherwise. Reported are mean and standard deviations (in parentheses) of ISSUER, INDIVIDUAL, and the accounting variables. The variables are defined as follows: ISSUER is the average numerical value of the bank's MLTD, S&PLT, and FLT ratings. INDIVIDUAL is the average numerical value of the bank's MBFS and FRI ratings. Total Assets is the bank's book value of total assets in billions of euros. CAPITAL is the bank's ratio of the book value of equity to total assets. PROFIT is the bank's ratio of the operating income minus operating costs to total earning assets. LOANLOSS is the bank's ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans. is the bank's bailout probability corresponding to the assigned Fitch support rating. Reported are the mean values of ISSUER, INDIVIDUAL, SUPPMOODYS, SUPPFITCH, and the control variables of GOBs and non-GOBs. GOBs are defined in two alternative ways: GOB is a dummy variable that equals one if any percentage of the bank's equity capital is held by either a national or a local government, and zero otherwise. GOB10 is a dummy variable that equals one if either a national or local government holds at least 10% of the bank's equity capital, and zero otherwise. The value in square brackets is the t-statistic for testing the equality of variable means. The variables are defined as follows: ISSUER is the average numerical value of the bank's MLTDS, S&PLT, and FLT ratings. INDIVIDUAL is the average numerical value of the bank's MBFS and FRI ratings. Total Assets is the bank's book value of total assets in billions of euros. SUPPMOODYS is the absolute difference between the numerical values of the MLTDS and MBFS ratings, as defined in Table 1 .3. SUPPFITCH is the bank's bailout probability corresponding to the assigned Fitch support rating. CAPITAL is the bank's ratio of the book value of equity to total assets. PROFIT is the bank's ratio of the operating income minus operating costs to total earning assets. LOANLOSS is the bank's ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. is a dummy variable that equals one if either a national or local government holds at least 10% of the bank's equity capital, and zero otherwise. GOBPERC is the ownership percentage of the bank's equity capital held by either a national or a local government. SIZE is the bank's log of total assets. LIST is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank is listed, and zero otherwise. GDPCHG is the annual growth rate of the GDP of the bank's country. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. is a dummy variable that equals one if either a national or local government holds at least 10% of the bank's equity capital, and zero otherwise. GOBPERC is the ownership percentage of the bank's equity capital held by either a national or local government. SIZE is the bank's log of total assets. LIST is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank is listed, and zero otherwise. GDPCHG is the annual growth rate of the GDP of the bank's country. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. . † In the ordered logit specification, the adjusted R 2 is the pseudo-R 2 . ‡ In the ordered logit specification, the dependent variable is the Fitch support rating rather than the associated probability. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. is a dummy variable that equals one if national elections occurred in the bank's country in year t-2, and zero otherwise. GOB is a dummy variable that equals one if any percentage of the bank's equity capital is held by either a national or a local government, and zero otherwise. SIZE is the log of the bank's total assets. LIST is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank is listed, and zero otherwise. GDPCHG is the annual growth rate of the GDP of the bank's country. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Reported are the coefficients and p-values (in parentheses) for the GOB×ELECTION t , GOB×ELECTION t-1 , and ELECTION t-2 variables in regressions similar to those reported in Table  6 .1. The dependent variables are the average numerical values of the MBFS and FRI ratings (INDIVIDUAL, Panel A) and the absolute differences between the numerical values of the bank's MLTDS and MBFS ratings, as defined in Table 1 ; OLS regressions run on the entire sample with robust standard errors corrected for clustering at both the country level and the bank level (row 3); and OLS regressions run on a subsample in which the German banks are excluded (row 4 -in such a case the p-values are based on robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the country level). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. is a dummy variable that equals one if either a national or local government holds at least 10% of the bank's equity capital, and zero otherwise. ELECTION t is a dummy variable that equals one in a year of national elections in the bank's country, and zero otherwise. ELECTION t-is a dummy variable that equals one if national elections occurred in the bank's country in year t-1, and zero otherwise. SIZE t-1 is the log of the bank's total assets as of year t-1. GDPCHG is the annual growth rate of the GDP of the bank's country. LOANS t-1 is the bank's ratio of loans to total earning assets as of year t-1. DEPOSITS t-is the bank's ratio of retail deposits to total funding as of year t-1. CAPITAL t-1 is the bank's ratio of the book value of equity to total assets as of year t-1. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
